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Abstract 
Purpose – This paper aims to present an integrated framework for ethical decision making in 
uncertain conditions, such as those of entrepreneurship. The model aims to build an exceptional 
ethical heuristic employable by entrepreneurs.  
Design/methodology/approach – The theoretical framework is anchored to Aquinas’ theory of 
practical reason virtue, specifically its minor virtue gnome, and the Kantian faculty of genius or to 
better say its modus operandi. Thanks to the composition of these prima facie distant ontologies it 
is possible to build a ‘ready-to-use’ heuristic.   
Findings – The paper through a philosophical discussion offers a ready-to-use heuristic that may 
help entrepreneurs and businesspersons when ‘navigating’ uncertain and troubled situations. In such 
situations, firstly it is important to recognize the ‘exceptionality’ of the situation, disregarding 
where necessary the ordinary criteria of judgment (an act directed by gnome). Secondly, a creative 
reconstruction of available knowledge able to re-shape the ‘rules of the game’ is needed (an act 
directed by PR but with connotations drawn from genius).    
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Research limitations/implications – The paper provides only a theoretical conceptualization of the 
heuristic model. However, the result is a ready-to-use heuristic rule for entrepreneurs, who work in 
uncertain and unclear conditions. Empirical validation of the framework can represent an 
opportunity for future research to test the operative impact of such an exceptional ethical heuristic. 
Originality/value – Little attention has been dedicated to ethical decision making in the 
entrepreneurial setting built on a virtue ethics approach. This paper’s proposed model may represent 
an innovative alternative to strictly rational models for ethical decision making. 
Keywords – Ethical decision making, Entrepreneurship, Heuristics, Gnome, Genius, Aquinas, Kant 
Paper type – Conceptual 
 
1. Introduction 
Traditional decision-making approaches often set apart moral and ethical considerations as if these 
elements would not be of interest in a completely rational choice model (Robinson et al., 2013). 
However, in a continuously increasing number of valuable contributions (O’Fallon and Butterfield, 
2005; Bastons, 2008), decision-making is claimed to be fully embedded into ethics and ethical 
beliefs. One of the most used perspectives in business refers to explaining the process of taking 
decisions as virtue ethics (e.g. Arjoon, 2008; Melé, 2010). However, most of such contributions 
tackle the problem in a ‘quite orthodox’ managerial fashion (e.g. Gibson, 2008; Grassl, 2010). 
A literature gap can be recognized concerning the application of virtue ethics in the 
entrepreneurship field, which, by its intrinsic nature faces uncertain conditions and circumstances 
(Kirzner, 1973). In such specific circumstances, the decision-making process has to include 
uncertainty, extraordinary contingencies, and unstructured problems (Sarasvathy, 2001). As pointed 
out by pertinent literature (e.g. Busenitz and Barney, 1997; Guercini et al., 2014), entrepreneurs 
seem to overcome such problems thanks to a marked use of heuristics, which are shortcuts and rules 
of thumb, allowing for fast decisions, and are indeed especially useful in uncertain and complex 
contexts (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Kahneman, 2011). For these 
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reasons, a possible gap in the decision-making literature may be depicted, particularly focusing on a 
virtue ethics perspective specifically ‘crafted’ for entrepreneurship and its particular decision-
making contingencies and processes. 
With this in mind, we will target the phronesis virtue, translated into modern English as practical 
reason (PR) or wisdom, with a specific focus on gnome, one of the minor virtues connected to it 
also referred to as a ‘potential part’ (Cessario, 2002). Gnome or perspicacity is the mental habit of 
the discernment that operates in exceptional and extraordinary cases (Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 
hereafter S.Th, IIae-IIae, q.51, a.4, 1947), which seems to fit perfectly with entrepreneurial ontology 
and nature (Pellegrini and Ciappei, 2015). Such a virtue, however, operates only in the cognitive 
moment of the decision: the judicium step (judgment), which is followed by the actual selection of 
preferred solution, i.e. the electio (choice) step (Westberg, 1994). In extraordinary contingencies, 
when they are recognized as such by gnome (Pellegrini and Ciappei, 2015), then the final 
choice/decision often needs to create a new set of rules to mold or shape this ‘blurred’ scenario into 
an ordered state. This is why the modus operandi of the genius elaborated by Kant (Critique of 
Judgment, hereafter CoJ, 1914) in our model seems able to fit the purpose. In a modern sense, the 
figure of the genius has been considered as “the avenue through which nature becomes subject to 
rules that have their origin in human reason” (Proulx, 2011, p.35). This implies that theoretically the 
figure’s modus operandi is able to create a set of new rules and thus create unexpected (innovative) 
outcomes. This would also imply a possible logical assumption: entrepreneurs strongly employ 
heuristics in their decision-making processes and such processes are informed by the virtue of PR; 
firstly, thanks to the directions given by its minor virtue gnome, and then finalized by PR itself, 
which, however, assumes a similar modus operandi to that of genius. This assumption will be 
synthesized into an exceptional ethical heuristic, with the traditional indication of search, stop and 
decision rules. Entrepreneurs can easily use this heuristic as a ‘guideline’ for their most important 
decisions, orienting their actions toward the good. 
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2. Entrepreneurial decision making and heuristics 
As premised, the virtue ethics perspective has often been used for blending traditional decision-
making processes and ethical considerations (Arjoon, 2008; Bastons 2008; Grassl 2010; Melé 
2010). The merit of these contributions is that of having ‘introduced’ the Ancient Greek Aristotelian 
tradition of the virtue into the modern context of business, setting a direct relation between the agent 
and his/her actions and the consequences especially in terms of internal consequences of who the 
agent becomes as a result (Ferrero and Sison, 2014). This approach stresses clearly that actions have 
consequences and these consequences are not only external but affect the agent who performs them 
(Bastons, 2008).  However, most of those works tackle the problem in a more ‘managerial fashion’; 
for example, Grassl (2010) clearly describes his decision-making model as a sequence of ends – or 
in managerial terms, goals – means (or resources), and execution (or implementation). This 
approach is surely generally applicable to all kinds of situations; however, in entrepreneurial 
activities, decision makers face uncertain conditions and circumstances with a limited access to 
information (Kirzner, 1973). Thus, in such specific circumstances, the decision-making process 
may not rely on strong planning. Similarly, Sarasvathy (2001) with her effectuation theory states 
that, in entrepreneurial settings, ends or goals are not always known nor fixed. Rather, entrepreneurs 
most of the time have resources (means) at their disposal and their courses of action result from 
‘constructing’ opportunities out of such a setting. 
While it is unwise to be open to a relativist perspective within ethical judgment, it is also true that 
completely disregarding contingencies would imply a ‘cold’ application of rules and principles 
without any form of moral sensitivity and, actually, this may lead to injustice (Buchholz and 
Rosenthal, 2005; Dunham, 2010). For this reason, several contributions have distinctly framed the 
problem of ethical decision making for entrepreneurship in comparison to a more traditional 
managerial situation (e.g. Buchholz and Rosenthal, 2005; Dew and Sarasvathy, 2007; Dunham, 
2010). Our contribution is to enrich the entrepreneurial ethical decision-making field using a virtue 
ethics perspective based on the Thomistic tradition (e.g. Bastons, 2008; Grassl, 2010; Melé, 2010). 
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Talking specifically about decision-making processes, entrepreneurs do not differ from other 
decision makers from a categorical perspective, but simply in their more frequent use of heuristics 
for appropriate situations (Busenitz and Barney, 1997; Gaglio and Katz, 2001; Read and 
Sarasvathy, 2005). Kahneman (2011) seminally defined the heuristic of judgment as “a simple 
procedure that helps find adequate, though often imperfect, answers to difficult questions” (p.97). 
Heuristics are specific instantiations of a strategy that ignores part of the available information in 
the problem space or with the goal of making decisions more quickly, frugally, and/or accurately 
than complex methods (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011; 
Kahneman, 2011; Artinger et al., 2015). For the purpose of this article, we focus on the recent 
paradigm called the “fast and frugal heuristics research program”1 (Gigerenzer et al., 1999). Such a 
paradigm highlights how heuristic decisions may be more appropriate in uncertain circumstances 
than rational and fully developed decisions. Especially in complex environments, typical of 
entrepreneurial settings characterized by unstructured problems (Artinger et al., 2015), heuristics 
allow decision makers to adaptively respond to contexts’ uncertainty. In such circumstances, 
rational strategies are less effective due to their excessive focus on rules and on a larger set of 
information (Guercini et al., 2014). Heuristics decisions may lead agents to implement strategies 
with an ‘ecological rationality’; in other words, the decision maker tries to match the internal 
perspective with the external contingencies aiming at coherence with the environment.  
Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) bundled the basic components of heuristics into three steps: 
search, stopping, and decision rules (p. 456). Firstly, the decision maker has to know where to find 
appropriate information and hints to implement a decision (search rules). Heuristics delimit the 
                                                        
1 In the pertinent literature, heuristics have been approached from two opposite points of view: the more recent 
paradigm, also used in this work, called the ‘fast and frugal heuristics research program’ (Gigerenzer et al., 1999) and 
the traditional paradigm called the ‘heuristics and biases research program’ (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). The latter 
framework interprets heuristics as inferior strategies for solving complex and structured problems. Heuristics are only 
‘shortcuts’ in comparison to a rational and deliberative strategy. Thus, according to such a stream of literature, heuristic 
decisions are biased and characterized by intuitive/irrational thinking. However, for the purpose of this work and the 
nature of the context of entrepreneurship, despite acknowledging the existence of a traditional negative view on 
heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), we consider this paradigm less appropriate and in a way outdated 
(Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011).  
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information needed by recognizing the relevance and availability of environmental resources. 
Kahneman (2011) stresses how in particular circumstances individuals make a judgment by simply 
relying on the available resources and instances. For this first phase, the important element is the 
ability to find relevant and available information so as ‘to grasp’ the essence of the situation, which 
much resembles the entrepreneurial concept of ‘alertness’ defined by Kirzner (1973). Secondly, it is 
also important to understand when to interrupt the process of collecting information (stopping 
rules). Without this second element, heuristics would differ little from traditional approaches  to 
decision making, which would imply a complete set of information.  Finally, with such a set of 
alternatives, a decision must be made (decision rules); in other words, an appropriate strategy has to 
be devised. According to this decision rule, heuristics determine the way through which the final 
decision is attained. The logical sequence is as follows (see Figure 1): the entrepreneur recognizes 
the relevant and available information, stops when such a satisfactory minimum level of relevant 
information is adaptively reached, thus allowing the most appropriate alternative to be chosen. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 
------------------------------- 
A general example of this process in entrepreneurship has been expressed by Berg (2014) in 
relation to the decision of an entrepreneur on where to locate his/her business. Successful 
entrepreneurs base such decisions on setting a bundle of ‘aspirational characteristics’ of the location 
(search), and the process is interrupted as soon as a satisfactory level of such characteristics is 
found in a single location (stop). The final decision falls upon the first object found with such a 
satisfactory level of characteristics (decision). Surprisingly such a simple and frugal decision path 
was the most cited by all the successful entrepreneurs (Berg, 2014). 
 
3. A theoretical framework for entrepreneurial heuristics  
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The aim of this paper is to propose an ethical decision-making model in extraordinary cases, i.e. for 
entrepreneurship, and then to develop an exceptional heuristic based on such a model. This model 
results in a ready-to-use tool that entrepreneurs and managers can use in their daily ethical decision-
making process. 
We modelled the decision-making process using Westberg’s (1994) interpretation of the Aquinas 
thought on human acting. In Westberg’s framework, the decision stage, or the decision-making 
process in managerial terms, is formed by two consequential steps (see Figure 2); the judicium (the 
judgment), which may be seen as the perception and evaluation of the alternatives available in order 
to solve a problem and be cognitive in nature, and the electio (the choice), the real choice or the 
final decision about presumably the best solution which is instead considered to be a willing act 
(S.Th, Iª-IIae, q.13, a.1-6). 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 
------------------------------- 
Thus, in order to construct a complete model, an analysis of both moments is necessary; in this 
perspective, we used the gnome concept, a minor virtue of PR, such as the virtue that informs the 
judgment step that has already been associated with a kind of entrepreneurial perspicacity 
(Pellegrini and Ciappei, 2015, p.770). Gnome guides the judgment step in extraordinary cases by 
eschewing the ordinary decisional criteria and individuating universal principles, which are 
effective also in the particular contingency. Instead for the step of choice, we used the philosophical 
concept of genius elaborated by Kant in his third critique (CoJ), specifically focusing on its modus 
operandi which is able to combine and re-shape judgment criteria, thus giving an ‘innovative’ rule 
to the status quo (CoJ, 5: 307; 174; see also Battersby, 1998; Proulx, 2011). 
Even if prima facie the Kantian ontology espouses with difficulty the traditional virtue ethics and 
the Thomistic paradigm, in a recomposed model of entrepreneurial judgment for extraordinary 
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cases, we may see a possible continuity. The following paragraphs will give a full account of these 
two elements, and the explanation of a possible final composition. 
 
3.1. Practical Reason and its minor virtue gnome 
A consistent number of contributions have successfully used the Aristotelian and Thomistic 
traditions with a specific focus on PR and the decision-making process (Buchholz and Rosenthal, 
2005; Bastons, 2008; Dunham, 2010; Grassl, 2010; Melé, 2010). The virtue of PR is the disposition 
of character in finding a proper means to reach particular ends (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI, 
5, 1138b24ff, 1968). PR is also considered to be a superior principle to face different contingencies 
and to discern the ‘good’ and ‘evil’ consequences of individual actions (MacIntyre, 1984). Thus, by 
interpreting the contingencies of reality and then ordering best actions, this virtue is rightly 
considered as to be central to any kind of ethical decision-making process (Melé, 2010). PR in the 
Thomistic vision is divided into integral, subjective, and potential parts (S.Th, IIae-IIae, q.48, a.1), 
which are all minor virtues of PR (for an extensive review of this topic see Bradley, 1997; Boethius, 
1998). 
The focus of this study concerns the potential parts that are specific and dedicated ‘powers’ or 
‘functions’ of the principal virtue so they are directed to certain secondary matters and acts (see 
Figure 3). Within PR potential parts, euboulia or good counsel concerns counselling and finding the 
right means for the action; synesis, or common sense, concerns judgment in matters of ordinary 
occurrence; gnome, or perspicacity, concerns judgment in matters of exception to the law. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 
------------------------------- 
Pellegrini and Ciappei (2015) have recently pointed out that entrepreneurial decision making needs 
to be based on the virtue of gnome. Such situations require a more ‘sensible’ kind of judgment since 
the contingencies are exceptional (extremely uncertain), thus the judgment too should be 
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exceptional. Indeed, gnome makes possible the application of superior principles, such as equity 
moderating and interpreting the norms in order to obtain fairer and better results when confronted 
with a special situation. In such cases, it is possible to disregard common principles and refer to 
equity or higher principles for the ‘greater good’ (Rodríquez-Luño, 1997).  
Thus, it is quite straightforward that gnome is mainly linked with uncertainty and extraordinary 
(exceptional) cases, i.e. as much as entrepreneurship would require. It is important to stress that 
gnome is not a kind of neutral-moral perspicacity or being cunning that would not serve the purpose 
of PR, its ‘mother’ virtue but is the ability of the judgment to be fairer in exceptional circumstances 
(Rodríquez-Luño, 1997). Also, referring again to Pellegrini and Ciappei (2015, pp. 778-783), this 
virtue has a component of an intellectual nature, thus is partially moral-neutral, but at the same time 
it is possible to recognize a dimension named ‘affective dimension’ that instead calls for a 
consideration of the consequences in relation to others. 
Concerning the application of this minor virtue to the decision-making process, its influence is 
limited to the first step of the judgment due to the pertinent function of gnome.  Specifically in the 
analysis of PR and its potential parts (S.Th, IIae-IIae, q.47, a.8, a.10, q.48, a.1), Aquinas assigned 
respectively the act of counselling to euboulia, and the act of judging to alternatively synesis or 
gnome, leaving the command act as the principal one of PR (S.Th, Ia-IIae, q.14, a.1). Hence,  gnome 
informs the step of judgment (judicium), and thus the function of judging in a model of human 
action, when extraordinary circumstances occur. Instead, the choice step (electio), being an act of 
the will (Westberg, 1994), necessarily needs to be guided by PR. Willpower needs structure and 
order and this is an act of command, thus it requires the guidance of PR and not of gnome (S.Th, Iª-
IIae, q.13, a.1; Cessario, 2002).  
3.2. The concept of genius in Kant and its application 
In our model, the step of choice (electio) is analyzed basing our considerations on the Kantian 
concept of the genius and its modus operandi elaborated in the third critique (CoJ). Such a concept 
recomposes the ‘fracture’ between freedom and nature that seems to affect all the Kantian 
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production (Proulx, 2011). Specifically, Kant defines genius as “the innate mental predisposition 
[ingenium] through which nature gives the rule to art” (CoJ, 5: 307; 174). Expanding this definition, 
the genius is seen as “a natural phenomenon, a result of nature’s original productivity”, and at the 
same time, “genius is the avenue through which nature becomes subject to rules that have their 
origin in human reason” (Proulx, 2011, p.35). This definition contains two important considerations 
about the genius concept. On the one hand, the genius is initially bounded by principles of nature, 
i.e. genius is a faculty given by nature. On the other hand, this consideration is valid only at the 
beginning of the process, when the genius is triggered. Indeed, once the action of the genius is 
accomplished, its creation may reshape the same natural principles from which it has been 
generated, thus creating new knowledge and a new set of rules (Battersby, 1998; Bruno, 2010; 
Proulx, 2011).  
Building upon the first consideration, it must be said that the genius is triggered by situations where 
a judgment cannot be clearly assessed by using the predetermined set of rules offered by nature, or 
in other words, when the actual solutions offered by the status quo are not satisfactory, due to the 
uncertainty of the situation (Proulx, 2011). Specifically, in Kantian words, the genius is triggered 
after a reflective judgment, which tries to interpret and explain undefined situations (contingencies) 
by finding universal principles that may regulate the situation itself. Such a situation is opposed to 
the application of determinant judgments, the other category of judgments for Kant, which instead 
apply universal principles to contingencies (CoJ, 5: 386-389). Thus, the faculty of genius, despite 
being closely connected with the judgment moment, i.e. the reflective type, occurs after it and 
consequently cannot be a capacity of the proper judicium step. 
The second consideration, i.e. the ability to reshape nature, is due to the characteristics of the genius 
of intentionally managing and manipulating various elements of knowledge, thus aiming at the 
creation of artistic outcomes (Battersby, 1998; Bruno, 2010). Therefore, the genius is a faculty of 
the will able to create and ‘to craft’ new solutions and knowledge for the situation and such 
outcomes may represent a new way through which future problems and situations will be assessed. 
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In other words, the genius can creatively shape new rules for action to adapt to the contingency 
(Gammon, 1997; Proulx, 2011). Sarasvathy and colleagues (2008) in describing the creation of 
Starbucks offer an exemplary case. Indeed Howard Schultz, the entrepreneur behind the success of 
the company, was able to create a completely new market for the coffee shops, out of the traditional 
successful elements of an Italian coffee bar, but that would suit the American mass market. Starting 
from a given situation, i.e. the tradition of Italian-style coffee bars, he succeeded in creating a new 
experience for the service, with chairs, a relaxed atmosphere and the introduction of flavored coffee 
beans. 
However, a premise is necessary for the correct use of the Kantian concept of genius in a quite 
distant domain, such as that of business. Originally, Kant used the genius figure only for aesthetic 
judgments and highlighted the capacity of the genius to select new judgment criteria, thus giving the 
rules to art (CoJ, 5: 307; 174). In Kant, the genius gives a new judgment rule to art and 
differentiates from the artist, who instead follows the existing judgment rules (Gammon, 1997; 
Battersby, 1998). Some scholars (e.g. Bruno, 2010; Hall, 2014) argue that the faculty of the genius 
may go beyond mere artistic production, claiming that any time a new ‘discovery’ occurs from 
elements of knowledge not known and not simply deductible by nature, the figure of the genius 
could be recognized.. In this paper, we do not want to stretch further the object of the figure of the 
genius that is aesthetically or in the most extreme case, the scientific domain. Rather, we consider 
that its modus operandi characterized by the ability to create new sets of rules (Bruno, 2010), is 
what happens in entrepreneurial context as the start of a new venture and/or a new market. This is 
also the reason why, we did not venture into an extremely detailed analysis of the deontological 
approach of Kant to morality and ethics that is definitely not compatible with a virtue ethics 
approach, which instead is the baseline of our discussion.  
The faculty of genius is linked to the step of judgment (judicium), because it refers to and uses 
judgment criteria, but it is excluded from the pure cognitive process because it aims to redefine of 
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these criteria to create a new set of rules that instead is an act of the will, and thus to the step of 
choice (electio). 
 
3.3. Gnome and genius recomposed into a unique framework 
Gnome and the genius seem to share some basic paradigms and similarities, even if philosophically 
speaking the two ontologies are difficult to be reconciled. Firstly, gnome operates a kind of 
judgment that is ‘extraordinary’, which can correctly judge exceptional cases, those that escape the 
normal rules of common sense where a higher sensibility is required (S.Th, IIae-IIae, q.48, a.1). 
Similarly, the genius operates in similar complex situations, where a judgment cannot be exerted on 
common and predetermined rules, since the contingencies of the situation do not allow for an easy 
application of common judgment rules. For this reason, the genius seems to work in situations 
where the virtue of gnome is required as well. From a Kantian perspective, despite a completely 
different approach, a reflective judgment can be considered as ‘extraordinary’ (Gammon, 1997; 
Proulx, 2011) and cannot be assessed by the normal deductive mode. Thus, since a reflective 
judgment and a judgment based on gnome seem to have similar connotations, we can transitively 
assert that gnome can trigger genius too. More precisely, as we already stressed, gnome can trigger 
a PR with a genius’ modus operandi.  
Secondly, gnome activates the possibility for the agent to disregard the actual paradigm and 
‘common’ rules in favor of an application of higher (moral) principles such as equity (S.Th, Ia-IIae, 
q.57, a.6 and IIae-IIae, q.51, a.4). However, the action of gnome is limited to breaking or 
disregarding the ordinary rules and identifying the general principles without setting courses of 
action which have to be taken (electio step) since this step is reserved for PR. In our discussion, the 
modus operandi of genius seems in continuity with such processes directed by PR. Indeed, if PR 
would operate as described by the genius faculty, this creates a new set of rules and/or criteria of 
selection from both the generality of principles and the specificity of the contingent case. Thus, the 
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modus operandi of genius in a contingent situation is able to act by modifying the ordinary rules 
and identifying new decision criteria (Gammon, 1997). 
Despite such similarities of gnome and genius and this possible continuity, we must stress that 
differences do exist. Gnome in Aquinas searches existing standards or higher principles imprinted in 
the soul (S.Th, IIae-IIae, q.51, a.4; Rodríquez-Luño, 1997), while the genius of Kant builds new 
rules. However, both gnome and genius help to assemble elements of knowledge for decisions in 
extraordinary cases: gnome deals with the breakdown of the principles and genius deals with the 
reconstruction in order to create new rules. In managerial terms this means that gnome allows 
entrepreneurs to disregard their traditional mental schemata (Pellegrini and Ciappei, 2015), while 
genius allows the best and creative solutions to be found. 
Despite the description of our model appearing to be moral-neutral, the presence of gnome, as a 
minor virtue of PR, assures an ‘ethical’ decision-making process. Indeed, gnome individuates 
universal decision criteria oriented toward the good, thus distinguishing between good and evil in 
extraordinary cases, where ordinary rules are not suitable. 
Instead, the genius, especially its modus operandi is neutral; however if the universal concepts on 
which the genius works are identified by gnome then its action will also necessarily be oriented 
toward the good, creating an adaptively set of rules with ethical connotations. It is useful to stress 
again that while the presence of gnome guarantees ethicality in the whole decision stage, properly 
when the judicium step takes place and indirectly in the electio step through the action of igniting 
genius on ethical premise, PR is the only virtue that can assure an ethical behavior. In order to have 
ethical and virtuous actions, PR needs to be present in the implementation of the action, i.e. the 
stage of execution according to Westberg’s (1994) model. In entrepreneurial contexts, we only 
stressed that such an act of PR assumes a modus operandi similar to that of genius.    
 
4. An exceptional ethical heuristic for entrepreneurial settings 
4.1. Integrating gnome and genius into heuristics 
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In the ethical model for decisions in extraordinary cases proposed here, gnome judges the 
extraordinary contingencies (judicium step), and the genius’ modus operandi achieves the choice 
for the final decision rooted in the virtue of PR (electio step) (Westberg, 1994), as we have already 
presented. However, since our model aims to explain an entrepreneurial decision making that is 
based on heuristics (Busenitz and Barney, 1997; Read and Sarasvathy, 2005), especially from a fast 
and frugal perspective (Gigerenzer et al., 1999), how are these two elements related to heuristics? 
Gnome shares the context of application with the heuristics: uncertainty, complexity and 
extraordinary contingencies. Indeed, gnome is the mental habit that operates in exceptional cases 
(S.Th, IIae-IIae, q.51, a.4), in which the normal rules stop working. In the same way, heuristics are 
one of the commonest methods to deal with unfamiliar and complex conditions (Gigerenzer et al., 
1999; Kahneman, 2011). In particular, fast and frugal heuristics allow entrepreneurs and managers 
to rapidly select and implement decisions with few clues and limited information taken in 
conditions of uncertainty and complexity.  
The interaction between man and nature represents a link between the genius concept and fast and 
frugal heuristics. Indeed, the genius, according to the Kantian concept, is able to reconstruct a 
balance between personal freedom and the rules of nature. Similarly, from a heuristic perspective, 
the homo heuristicus adaptively interacts with the external environment combining his/her 
personality (Guercini et al., 2014). Therefore, both genius and heuristics foster the strategic 
interaction between human freedom and the uncertain and complex environment, allowing for 
better adaptive solutions to unstructured problems (Artinger et al., 2015).  
Thus, a heuristic based on gnome and the genius’ modus operandi allows the decision maker to stop 
the application of normal rules thanks to gnome and then allows the selection and creation of a new 
set of criteria thanks to PR that assumes a modus operandi similar to that of genius. 
 
4.2. The exceptional ethical heuristics 
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Having explained the relationship of heuristics to the philosophical elements, gnome and genius, it 
is important to construct a ‘ready-to-use’ or ‘practical’ heuristic for decision makers (Artinger et al., 
2015) what we have called an exceptional ethical heuristic (Figure 4) . 
As explained previously, heuristics are composed of three fundamental building blocks: search, 
stopping and decision rules (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011). 
The search and stopping rules, due to their nature, are included in the step of judgment (judicium), 
thus associated with gnome, while the decision rules are included in the step of choice (electio), and 
are thus associated to genius’ modus operandi rooted in PR. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 
------------------------------- 
Search rule (using gnome): Identify ordinary criteria for the specific decision and contingency, and 
evaluate their correct application. 
Stopping rule: (using gnome) Stop when more than one criterion does not fit with the contingencies. 
Thus, from the ordinary criteria for the specific decision, ascend towards the related universal 
principles. Stop as soon as the connected universal principles for each criterion for the specific 
decision are found. 
Decision rule: (using PR and the genius’ modus operandi) Select the universal principles that are 
more important in the specific extraordinary case and from these define a new set of rules to make 
the specific decision. 
A heuristic for extraordinary cases begins with a searching phase. Following the initial searching 
rule, this heuristic first of all needs to identify an ordinary or extraordinary case. In order to do that, 
the searching rules needs to find ordinary criteria for the specific decision and contingency. 
However, if the contingencies are extraordinary, these criteria are not appropriate. This searching 
rule is translated into a ‘traditional’ ethical evaluation exerted with common ethical principles. 
However, in this case, the scenario formed by a traditional judgment should seem to the agent to be 
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unfair and unethical. Thus, gnome in the searching phase stimulates the acknowledgement of 
unethical outputs caused by an ‘ordinary’ ethical evaluation. Building on Pellegrini and Ciappei’s 
(2015, pp.782) elaboration, in this phase gnome scans “initial symptoms, weak signals and hints 
coming from the circumstances” and charges them of emotional contents.  
Consequently, the circumstances require the intervention of the virtue gnome to stop the application 
of normal rules. As we said before, the action of gnome allows the derogation of the normal rules 
and the search for universal/higher principles that can guide the ‘extraordinary’ evaluation. In the 
stopping phase, gnome marks the amount of operational information needed by the decision maker 
(Gigerenzer et al., 1999) to assess the exceptionality of the case. Specifically, the virtue of gnome 
identifies for each ordinary criterion for the specific decision, the possibility of application. The 
process is stopped when a fair amount of criteria does not respond to the contingencies of the 
situation. Gnome in this phase is able to ‘imagine’ and evaluate scenarios in which the ordinary 
rules are disregarded, referring to the universal/higher principles (Buchholz and Rosenthal, 2005).   
In the deciding phase, genius, or to better say PR with a modus operandi similar to that of genius, 
selects the universal/higher principles that are the most relevant for the extraordinary contingency, 
and recombines them in order to create a new set of rules. This intervention of genius’ modus 
operandi allows PR to have an adaptive response to extraordinary circumstances that is more 
effective than pure rational strategies, which are too focused on rules and larger sets of information.  
 
Conclusion 
The outcome of this paper is the development of a comprehensive model for entrepreneurial ethical 
decision making in extraordinary cases with a virtue ethics approach. As a result, we defined an 
exceptional ethical heuristic based on the ethical elements of gnome and genius’ modus operandi 
rooted in the PR virtue. 
This model could increase entrepreneurs’ awareness of ethical concerns in the blurred conditions of 
entrepreneurship (Buchholz and Rosenthal, 2005; Dunham, 2010). Indeed, this paper stresses a 
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specific gap in entrepreneurship that faces extraordinary (extremely uncertain) cases and situations. 
The conceptual model is shaped in a heuristic that allows entrepreneurs to respond adaptively to 
contexts’ uncertainty and extraordinary contingencies. 
The main limitation of this work is related to using a mostly theoretical approach to sustain our 
claims. Further studies should employ our proposition regarding the exceptional ethical heuristic to 
test it in empirical settings and also test its adherence to reality. However, offering a theoretical 
heuristic rule can already be of some use for entrepreneurs as a guideline for their actual daily 
judgments. 
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